[文/ 周波]
那些迫不及待地祝賀拜登勝選的國傢都是美國的盟友，這並不令人意外。過去的四年裡，特朗普的“美國第一”政策和對北約國傢的惡語相向讓所有盟友都感到不安，他們當然會熱烈擁抱那個說“我們將重返賽場，這次美國不再單打獨鬥”的人。
據英國《金融時報》報道，歐盟最近起草瞭一份計劃，呼籲美國抓住這次“千載難逢的機會”，組建新的全球聯盟，終結特朗普時代的緊張局勢，迎接中國帶來的“戰略挑戰”。
這可能說來容易做起來難。跨大西洋關系已經遭受的損害，並不是一個可以輕易填補的細小裂縫。特朗普是罕見的稱北大西洋公約組織“過時”的美國總統，但他肯定不是第一個對歐洲長期搭美國“安全保護傘”便車感到焦躁的美國總統。
唯一不同的是，他對盟友不留情面的抨擊雖然毫無總統風范，但卻收效明顯。如今，八個北約國傢——相比之下，奧巴馬政府任期結束時隻有四個——正在實現將其國內生產總值的2%用於國防的目標。像拜登這樣被佈什稱為“好人”的總統能否做到這一點還有待觀察。
某種程度上，跨大西洋關系成功與否取決於美國是否願意讓其盟友搭便車。當蘇聯的威脅瓦解時，西方的團結開始分化。盡管美國和歐洲仍有一些共同目標，但它們的緊迫性和嚴重性已不可同日而語。當美國收縮時，歐洲就不再處於優先位置。
盟國繳納的會費越多，美國就可能越快擺脫責任，退出歐洲。
隻有兩種情形可以加強以美國為首的聯盟。第一種是盟友與美國一起對抗美國的主要競爭對手中國。但中國是美國幾乎所有歐洲和亞洲盟友的最大貿易夥伴。在與中國打交道時，佈魯塞爾和華盛頓很難在大西洋兩岸的大國之間和歐洲內部達成諒解。
對於華盛頓在印太地區的盟友來說，學學美國，喊喊“航行自由”是一回事，與世界第二大經濟體叫板則完全是另一回事。以澳大利亞為例，其出口貨物的大約三分之一都駛向中國港口。
第二種情形是中國和俄羅斯結成同盟，引發新冷戰。北京和莫斯科越走越近，部分原因是兩國都被視為華盛頓的主要競爭對手。因此，華盛頓對莫斯科的任何壓力都隻會讓俄羅斯更靠近中國，反過來，對北京的壓力也會讓中國更接近俄羅斯。
中俄兩國不僅每年進行聯合演習，近年來還舉行瞭計算機模擬反導演習和聯合空中戰略巡航。
10月份，當被問及莫斯科和北京之間是否有可能建立軍事聯盟時，普京總統回答說，“我們不需要它，但理論上說，想象一下還是很有可能的”。
以美國為首的聯盟的價值更多體現在政治上而非軍事上。北約在其官網上宣稱，北約的首要目標是促進“民主價值觀”，但中國沒有表現出挑戰任何西方價值觀的意圖。
中國已經明確表示不會輸出自己的意識形態或發展模式。盡管中國已經有瞭全球影響力，但主要體現在經濟領域。中國人民解放軍增加瞭在海外的軍事活動，但這些活動迄今僅限於人道主義領域。
中國對西方的挑戰不是意識形態上的，而是心理上的：一個“威權”國傢怎麼可能發展得如此之快，甚至有一天會成為世界上最大的經濟體？簡短的答案是：因為中國的崛起是從內部產生的。
作為全球化和市場經濟的最大受益者，中國沒有必要挑戰現行的國際體系。北京隻是證明瞭並不是條條大路都必然通向羅馬，選擇不同發展模式和價值觀的國傢照樣可以成功。
西方的問題在於它自戀地將二戰後的70餘年等同於“自由的國際秩序”，並希望這一秩序繼續下去。但即使大多數機構和規則的確是西方在戰後設計和建立的，這樣的秩序也不存在。
必須指出的是，1945年以來，非洲50多個國傢的獨立、美蘇對抗以及中國崛起等重大事件，也重塑瞭國際秩序。中國和俄羅斯在聯合國安理會的否決權亦對國際安全至關重要。
所謂的“自由的國際秩序”，充其量也就是蘇聯解體之後、中國全面崛起之前、西方的影響力呈壓倒性優勢的大約15年左右的短暫時期。
如果小國抱團應對重大外部威脅，這完全可以理解。但是如果地球上最強大的國傢感到有必要加強聯盟，那就讓人很困惑瞭。
美國第15任總統佈坎南曾說過:“自華盛頓時代以來，避免聯盟糾纏一直是我們政策的準則，其智慧無人可駁詰。”看到美國在相反的方向上走瞭這麼遠，真可謂莫大的諷刺。
(“中國論壇”許馨勻譯自《南華早報》，翻頁閱讀英文原文)
Why Joe Biden will struggle to rebuild the decaying transatlantic alliance to counter China
The countries which could not wait to congratulate Joe Biden on winning the presidency are America’s allies. This should be no surprise. In the past four years, Donald Trump’s “America first” policy and his alarming words to Nato have unnerved them all. They could only rejoice to embrace a man who said: “We’re going to be back in the game. It’s not America alone.”
According to the Financial Times, the European Union has recently drafted a plan to call on the United States to seize a “once-in-a-generation” opportunity to form a new global alliance, burying the tensions of the Trump era and meeting the “strategic challenge” presented by China.
This is probably easier said than done. The damage done to transatlantic ties is not a hairline crack that can be easily filled. Trump is the rare US president who called the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation “obsolete”, but he is certainly not the first one who fretted that Europe had been getting a free ride on the US security umbrella for too long.
The only difference is that his relentless ally-bashing, however unbecoming of a president, has worked. Now, eight Nato countries – compared to four by the end of the Obama administration – are meeting the target of spending 2 per cent of their gross domestic product on defence. It remains to be seen if a “good man” like Biden, as George W. Bush has called him, could do the same.
To some extent, the success of transatlantic relations rests on America’s willingness to give its allies a free ride. When the Soviet threat collapsed, Western solidarity started to fray. Although America and Europe still share some common goals, they are of a different order of urgency and seriousness. When it comes to American entrenchment, Europe is no longer a priority.
And the more the allies pay their dues, the quicker the US might shake off its responsibilities and withdraw from Europe.
There are only two scenarios in which the US-led alliance could be strengthened. The first involves American allies joining the US in confronting China – America’s primary competitor. But China is the largest trading partner of almost all the US’ European and Asian allies. Brussels and Washington can hardly bury the hatchet both between the transatlantic powers and within the European bloc when it comes to dealing with China.
For Washington’s allies in the Indo-Pacific, it is one thing to sing the American chant of “freedom of navigation”; it is quite another to take on the world’s second-largest economy. Take Australia, for instance. About a third of its total exports are destined for Chinese shores.
In the second scenario, China and Russia forge an alliance, triggering a new cold war. Beijing and Moscow are becoming ever closer, partly because both have been cast as Washington’s primary competitors. Therefore, any pressure from Washington on Moscow will only drive Russia closer to China, and the same goes for Beijing.
Not only do China and Russia conduct joint exercises on an annual basis, in recent years they have also launched anti-missile war games, and carried out a joint strategic air patrol.
Asked in October whether a military union between Moscow and Beijing was likely, Russian President Vladimir Putin replied that “we don’t need it, but, theoretically, it’s quite possible to imagine it”.
The value of a US-led alliance is more political than military. The primary objective of Nato, as indicated on its website, is to promote “democratic values”. But China has shown no intention to challenge any Western values.
China has made it clear that it won’t export its ideology or development model. Although China already has global influence, it is felt primarily in economic sectors. The People’s Liberation Army has increased its activities overseas, but these activities are so far restricted to humanitarian areas.
The challenge China poses to the West is not ideological; rather, it is psychological: how can an “authoritarian” state develop so quickly, perhaps even becoming the world’s largest economy one day? The short answer is: because China’s rise is from within.
As the largest beneficiary of globalisation and the market economy, China has no need to challenge the current international system. Beijing is only proving that not all roads necessarily lead to Rome, and that those with different development models and values can still succeed.
The problem with the West is that it has narcissistically equated the seven decades after World War II with “the liberal International order” and wants the order to continue. But there is no such order, even if most of the institutions and regimes were indeed designed and built by the West after the war.
It must be noted that major events such as the independence of more than 50 African countries, the rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union, and the rise of China, to name just a few, have also reshaped the international order since 1945. China’s and Russia’s veto power on the UN Security Council also matters in no small way to international security.
What appears to be a liberal international order, at best, really lasted 15 years or so: a fleeting period when the influence of the West was overwhelming, right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and before China’s rise entered full swing.
When small nations hang together against a major external threat, it is perfectly understandable. But if the strongest nation on Earth feels a need to strengthen an alliance, it is rather baffling.
James Buchanan, the 15th American president, once said: “To avoid entangling alliances has been a maxim of our policy ever since the days of Washington, and its wisdom no one will attempt to dispute.” It is ironic to see how far America has gone in the opposite direction.